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The Diversity and Remedial Interests
in University Admissions Programs
BY KATHRYNE RAINES*
INTRODUCTION
T his nation was founded on the principle that all men are created
equal.' Unfortunately, throughout American history this ideal has
not always been promoted. In fact, the drafters of the Constitution initially
undercut this basic tenet with its antithesis: slavery.2 The effects and results
of slavery are notorious. American leaders today are still faced with its
issues and the hope of equal opportunity for all, regardless of race.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment sets forth
that "[n]o State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."3 This clause was generally ignored in its early
existence and was even turned against those whom it was designed to aid,
per the claim that "separate but equal" fulfilled its purpose.' In 1954, the
United States Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. Board of Education5 that
separate schools and public facilities are inherently unequal and thus
unconstitutional.6 Since then, courts have endeavored to appropriately and
consistently interpret the Equal Protection Clause, particularly in reference
to racial classifications.
Affirmative action programs have attempted to alleviate the repercus-
sions of unfortunate early oppression and the additional benefits of these
programs have become apparent. However, the methods used in implement-
ing these programs have often been criticized as violating the Equal
Protection Clause. Recent cases involving university admissions programs
J.D. expected 2003, University of Kentucky.
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 326 (1978)
(Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).21d.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326.
5 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).61d.
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have once again brought this affirmative action debate to the forefront.7 The
Supreme Court has not ruled on a university's affirmative action policy
since the 1978 case Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.' This
decision has since been subject to a variety of interpretations, leaving the
issue of the constitutionality of race-based university admissions programs
unclear. Thus, many states that have been handed decisions from federal
courts striking down race-based policies have been forced to look for
alternate means of achieving the same benefits of race-based affirmative
action.
This Note focuses on the recent judicial decisions involving the
constitutionality of university race-based admissions policies and their
ramifications. Part I discusses Bakke, the Supreme Court's most recent
ruling on university affirmative action programs.9 Part U examines how
various courts have interpreted Bakke and what the courts have held to
constitute a "compelling governmental interest."'" Part 1H investigates new
programs implemented in some states aimed toward emulating the benefits
of affirmative action." Part IV considers the future of affirmative action,
addressing the Supreme Court's inevitable return to the question of
affirmative action programs in educational settings. This Note explores the
plethora of benefits to educational environments provided by race-based
admissions programs and concludes that such programs should be found
constitutional. 2
I. U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN AFFIRMATVE ACTION CASES
A. The Bakke Case
The Supreme Court last addressed affirmative action in university
admissions programs in the 1997 Bakke case. In Bakke, the admissions
policy of the Medical School of the University of California at Davis was
at issue. 3 The university reviewed candidates for admission under either
the regular admissions program or the special admissions program. 4
7 Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (2001); Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F.
Supp. 2d 811 (2000).8 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 267.
9 See infra notes 13-64 and accompanying text.
'o See infra notes 65-178 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 179-222 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 223-41 and accompanying text.
13 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-70.
'4 Id. at 273-75.
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Through the regular admissions program, applicants with overall under-
graduate grade point averages below 2.5 on a scale of 4.0 were promptly
rejected. 5 The special admissions program reviewed candidates to fill the
sixteen places in the entering class of one hundred reserved for "disadvan-
taged" minorities in the classes of 1973 and 1974.6 In order to determine
which candidates were eligible for special review, the application forms
asked whether they "wished to be considered as 'economically and/or
educationally disadvantaged' applicants and members of a 'minority
group." " 7 Those ultimately found to fit both requirements were then
reviewed under the special admissions program, in which they did not have
to meet the 2.5 grade point average standard.'I
Allan Bakke, a white male, applied to the medical school two
consecutive years and was rejected each time after a review of his
application under the regular admissions policy.' 9 After his second
rejection, Bakke sued the University of California arguing that the "special
admissions program operated to exclude him from the school on the basis
of his race, in violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."2 A highly divided Supreme Court ultimately
found Davis Medical School's particular policy unconstitutional.2
Bakke established a strict scrutiny standard of review for race-based
programs. A strict scrutiny standard requires that a two-prong test be met:
(1) the race-based classification must meet a compelling governmental
interest, and (2) the classification must be precisely tailored to serve that
interest.22 Justice Powell stated that "[t]he guarantee of equal protection
11 Id. at 273.
11 Id. at 275.
17 Id. at 274. Minority groups, for the medical school's application purposes,
consisted of "blacks," "Chicanos," "Asians," and "American Indians." Id.
'
8Id. at 275.
9 d. at 276. Allan Bakke had an overall grade point average of 3.46 from his
undergraduate institution. The average overall grade point averages for those
admitted through the special program was 2.88 in 1973 and 2.62 in 1974. Id.
2 0 Id. at 277-78. Bakke also alleged that the special program violated Art. I, §
21, of the California Constitution, and § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which provides that "[n]o person... shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." Id. at 278 n. 11.21 See also Mark R. Killenbeck, Pushing Things Up To Their First Principles:
Reflections on the Values ofAffirmative Action, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1299 (Dec. 1999)
(providing a detailed look at the Bakke decision).
"Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299.
2002-20031
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else
when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the
same protection, then it is not equal."23 Thus, under Bakke, strict scrutiny
should be applied to all cases when race is at issue; it cannot be applied
only in certain situations depending upon whether a minority or majority
group is involved.24 All "[riacial and ethnic classifications.., are subject
to stringent examination without regard to these additional characteris-
tics."'25 Following earlier case precedent, the court asserted that "[riacial
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for
the most exacting judicial examination."26 This strict scrutiny standard must
be applied with respect to every person regardless of race.27
Bakke has been subject to various interpretations by lower courts
because the Supreme Court was so divided in its ruling. Four justices,
known as the Brennan Group,28 found the Davis Medical School's policy
to be constitutional.29 The Stevens Group3" voted to strike down the
program, claiming that any consideration of race violated Bakke's rights
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.31 Justice Powell provided the
decisive vote, finding the Davis Medical School's admissions program to
be unconstitutional. However, Powell stated that race, in some instances,
can be constitutionally used in admissions programs. Thus Powell and the
Stevens Group comprised a majority, effectively striking down the
admissions policy. On the other hand, Powell and the Brennan Group
constituted a majority for the proposition that race can be constitutionally
used as a factor in admissions policies. Justice Powell wrote what is
generally viewed as the majority opinion, however, some federal courts
refuse to follow his decision, alleging that it is not binding law.32
23 Id. at 289-90.
24 d.
25 Id.
261d. at 291. See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).27 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294.
28 The Brennan Group included Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun.
29 Corinne E. Anderson, A Current Perspective: The Erosion of Affirmative
Action in University Admissions, 32 AKRON L. REv. 181, 193 (1999).
" Justice Stevens wrote the concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Burger,
Justice Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist joined forming what is called the Stevens
Group.
31 Anderson, supra note 29, at 192-93.
32 See Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); Johnson v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11 th Cir. 2001).
[VOL. 91
UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS
1. The Compelling Governmental Interest of Diversity
The two prongs of strict scrutiny require that the race-based classifica-
tions meet a compelling governmental interest and that the classification be
narrowly tailored to fulfill that interest." Justice Powell stated that in
"'order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that
its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial,
and that its use of the classification is "necessary... to the accomplish-
ment" of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest."' 34
The Davis Medical School claimed its special admissions program
served a number of purposes. Although the majority opinion easily discards
most of these purposes, the opinion spends considerable time discussing the
diversity purpose.35 Justice Powell writes that diversity "clearly is a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education."36
Indeed, diversity in academic environments provides a plethora of benefits
to students. 7 An essential part of higher education is an environment of
3 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
34 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22
(1973)).
" The university claimed that the special admissions programs served the
following interests: "(i) 'reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored
minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession,'...; (ii) countering the
effects of societal discrimination; (iii) increasing the number of physicians who
will practice in communities currently underserved; and (iv) obtaining the
educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body." Id. at 306
(footnote omitted).361Id. at 311-12.
31 See id. at 313 n.48 (quoting the former Princeton University president from
Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY. 7, 9
(Sept. 26, 1977)). The [former] president of Princeton stated:
[A] great deal of learning occurs informally. It occurs through interactions
among students of both sexes; of different races, religions, and back-
grounds; who come from cities and rural areas, from various states and
countries; ... and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn from their
differences and to stimulate one another to reexamine even their most
deeply held assumptions about themselves and their world. As a wise
graduate of ours observed in commenting on this aspect of the educational
process, "People do not learn very much when they are surrounded only by
the likes of themselves."
... For many... the unplanned, casual encounters with roommates,
fellow sufferers in an organic chemistry class, student workers in the
library, teammates on a basketball squad, or other participants in class
affairs or student government can be subtle and yet powerful sources of
2002,2003]
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"'speculation, experiment and creation' ... [which] is widely believed to
be promoted by a diverse student body."38 Justice Powell also advanced the
idea that academic freedom within university education invokes the
Constitution:39
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom which
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment .... The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection." 0
Although diversity was found to be a compelling governmental interest,
the facts of the Bakke case did not meet the second prong of strict scrutiny
because the racial classifications used by the Davis Medical School were
not necessary to promote this interest." The Court found that reserving a
specified number of seats for particular ethnic minorities does not, in effect,
further the goal of diversity.42
Diversity in academic settings encompasses, according to Justice
Powell, more than a variety of races. 43 Rather, diversity's benefits are
attained through a broad array of backgrounds, beliefs, and characteristics.
improved understanding and personal growth.
Id.
38 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
39 See also Ruth L. Davidson & John L. Strope, Jr., Permission v. Academic
Freedom and Free Speech: A Review ofUrofsky v. Gilmore, 149 EDUC. L. REP.
1, at * 10 (Jan. 18, 2001) (providing a briefcase history of academic freedom and
claiming this freedom belongs to the institution).
40 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967)) (alteration in original).41id. at 314-16.
41 Justice Powell stated that the fatal flaw in the school's admissions program
was that:
It tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally
excluded from a specific percentage of the seats in an entering class. No
matter how strong their qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular,
including their own potential for contribution to educational diversity, they
are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred





Of course, different ethnicities and races comprise a part of diversity;
however, it cannot be the only factor considered. A "special admissions
program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than
further attainment of genuine diversity."" Thus, while diversity is a
compelling governmental interest, a rigid quota system admitting students
based on their race alone is not the appropriate means to accomplish that
interest.4"
2. Righting Wrongs: Remedial Purposes of Affirmative Action
Remedial purposes, like diversity, may serve as a justification for
preferential treatment of certain races. Bakke held that there is a "legitimate
and substantial [governmental] interest in ameliorating, or eliminating
where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination."' Earlier
desegregation cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education," set out the
importance of such a goal. However, Justice Powell asserts that the Court
has "never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as
members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent
individuals in the absence ofjudicial, legislative, or administrative findings
of constitutional or statutory violations."' 8 If such findings of constitutional
or statutory violations are uncovered, then this preferential treatment is
substantiated as a vindication of victims' legal rights.49 In the absence of
such findings, there is no governmental interest in helping one person while
harming another."0
In Bakke, the Davis Medical School's policy focused on education, not
on remedying earlier illegality.5' The administration did not establish that
the special admissions program used the race factor as a reaction to
discrimination. For instance, the University of California at Davis did not
even explain how they chose the four preferential racial groups.52 The
medical school's selection of disadvantaged races did not, under Bakke,
justify discriminating against others not responsible for the alleged harm
"Id.
45 d. at 315-18.
4Id. at 307.
47 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
41 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 308-09.
51 Id. at 309.52Id. at 310 n.45.
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done.53 Thus, the remedial interest of using race-based admissions was not
met.
B. The Supreme Court's Ruling in Affirmative Action Since Bakke
The Supreme Court has not ventured to rule on the use of affirmative
action in university admissions programs since Bakke. However, the Court
has addressed affirmative action in reference to employment situations.
These cases generally address and elaborate on the use of race-based
programs for remedial purposes. They also provide valuable insight into
how the Supreme Court applies the strict scrutiny standard.
For example, in Wygant v. Jackson Board ofEducation,54 a collective-
bargaining agreement that extended preferential protection against layoffs
to certain minority teachers was at issue.55 The Court of Appeals found that
the policy of providing more security to minority teachers was "an attempt
to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination" and that this "was
sufficiently important to justify the racial classification embodied in the
layoff provision."56 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that societal
discrimination alone has never been able to justify such a racial classifica-
tion." According to the Court, the discrimination needs to be more specific
than general societal discrimination.
A few years later, the Supreme Court elaborated on the Wygant
conclusion in an affirmative action case involving a construction contract
in City ofRichmond v. JA. Croson Co.5" The program at issue required that
531d. at 310.
54Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
". Id. at 270-71. The collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the
Jackson Board of Education and the Jackson Education Association (a teachers'
union) provided:
"In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers
through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most
seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there be
a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current
percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff."
... When layoffs became necessary... it was evident that adherence to
the CBA would result in the layoff of tenured nonminority teachers while
minority teachers on probationary status were retained.
Id. 56Id. at 274 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1156-57
(6th Cir. 1984)).
57 id.5 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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contractors, who had construction contracts with the City of Richmond,
subcontract at least thirty percent of the value of those contracts to minority
businesses.59 The city argued that this plan was implemented to remedy past
discrimination of minorities in the construction industry.' However, the
Court found that "a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimi-
nation in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to
determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy."' Thus, the
past discrimination must be specific enough for a legislative body to tailor
a proper remedy. However, "the Supreme Court has yet to establish specific
rules for determining precisely how 'localized' past discrimination must be
before a particular governmental entity . . . can, consistent with the
Constitution, use racial preferences to remedy the effects of prior discrimi-
nation."'62 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has made it clear that societal
or generalized discrimination will not meet the strict scrutiny standard.
It is apparent from the Supreme Court cases on race-based policies that
strict scrutiny always applies. A compelling governmental interest is
needed and the program must be narrowly tailored to address that interest.
It appears that the strongest "interests" available to universities in
complying with the strict scrutiny test are the diversity interest and the goal
of remedying past discrimination in their university.63 Diversity is an
important interest that is unique to university settings and may provide a
powerful distinction between affirmative action cases in employment and
university backgrounds. The remedial purposes of affirmative action have
been acknowledged by the Supreme Court as valid governmental interests
so long as the remedy can be narrowly tailored to ameliorate specific past
discrimination, as seen in the post-Bakke cases."4
II. POST-BAKKE: A VARIETY OF INTERPRETATIONS
Since Bakke, various lower courts have addressed the issue of race-
based admissions programs. The result has been different interpretations of
the Bakke decision and a split over what constitutes a compelling govern-
mental interest. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, deter-
mined that diversity is not a compelling governmental interest capable of
591 Id. at 477-78.
60 Id. at 479-81.
61 Id. at 498.
'
2 Hopwood v. State of Texas, 236 F.3d 256,273 (2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S.
929 (2001).
63 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-15 (1978).
6See infra Part II.
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withstanding the strict scrutiny standard.6" On the other hand, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and more recently the Sixth Circuit, held just the
opposite-4hat diversity is sufficient to fulfill the first prong of the strict
scrutiny standard." This section will explore the differing interpretations
effecting the circuit split.
A. The Fifth Circuit: Hopwood v. State of Texas
In Hopwood v. State of Texas67 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals first
rejected Justice Powell's diversity rationale." In the Hopwood case, Cheryl
Hopwood and three other Caucasians applied for admission to the 1992
entering class at the University of Texas Law School." All four applica-
tions were rejected by the school.7" They filed suit claiming, among other
things, that the admissions policy of the law school violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7
In the early 1990s, when Hopwood and the three other plaintiffs
applied, the law school largely based its initial admissions decisions upon
an applicant's "Texas Index" ('"I") number," a composition of an
applicant's undergraduate grade point average and the applicant's LSAT
score.73 Based on the calculated TI scores, applicants were placed into one
of three groups: "presumptive admit," "presumptive deny," or a middle
"discretionary zone."'74 Most of the applicants in the presumptive admit
"See Hopwood v. State of Texas (Hopwood fl), 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
" See Smith v. Univ. of Washington, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001); Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002).
67 Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 932.
" The Fifth Circuit first reviewed the Hopwood case for an intervention, known
as Hopwood L In 1996, in Hopwood II, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), the Court 6f
Appeals reviewed the District Court's first ruling (known as Hopwood A, 861 F.
Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994)) and ultimately remanded the case back to District
Court for reconsideration of damages (known as Hopwood B, 999 F. Supp. 872
(W.D. Tex. 1998)). Hopwood B was then reviewed again by the Fifth Circuit in
2000 (Hopwood III, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000)).
9 Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 938.
70Id.
" Id. They "also claimed derivative statutory violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 1983 and of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d." Id.
7 Id. at 935.
71 Id. The TI index for the 1992 entering class "accorded an approximate 60%
weight to LSAT scores and 40% to GPA." Id. at n. 1.
74 d. at 935.
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category were offered admission while most in the presumptive deny
category received little consideration.75 Those in the discretionary zone
were subjected to the most scrutiny.76 In 1992i when Hopwood's applica-
tion was considered, the presumptive admit TI score for "resident whites
and non-preferred minorities" was 199 and above." The presumptive admit
score for Mexican-Americans and African-Americans was only 189.78 The
presumptive deny TI score for non-minorities was 192 and lower, while the
score for the favored minorities was 179 and below.79 Hopwood had a TI
of 199 but was dropped into the discretionary zone while the other
plaintiffs had TIs of 197 and were reviewed in the discretionary category
as well." Ultimately, none of the plaintiffs were granted admission and
they claimed that they would have been granted admission if minorities
were not granted preferential treatment.8'
The Fifth Circuit applied the proper standard of strict scrutiny, under
which the question of race-based admissions is to be examined. This
analysis involved the two-prong test, which examines whether the policy
served a compelling governmental interest and whether it was narrowly
tailored to achieve that goal. 2 The district court's first review of the case
found that two interests promoted by the school met the first prong of the
test, those being "(1) 'obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a
racially and ethnically diverse student body' and (2) 'the objective of
overcoming past effects of discrimination.' "83 The Fifth Circuit reversed
this finding.
The court of appeals actually ruled on the Hopwood case on three
separate occasions. The first appeal, known as Hopwood I, was interlocu-
tory and simply affirmed a denial of intervention."' The second appeal,
known as Hopwood1,5 occurred in 1996 and reviewed the district court's
"Id. at 935-36.761d. at 936.
77Id.
78 Id. African-Americans and Mexican-Americans were the only two minority
groups given preferential treatment in the law school's admissions policies. Id. at




83 Id. (quoting Hopwood A, 861 F. Supp. 551, 571 (W.D. Tex. 1994)).
' Hopwood v. State of Texas (Hopwood II1), 236 F.3d 256, 260 (5th Cir.
2000).
s Hopwood v. State of Texas (Hopwood 11), 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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judgment on the merits (HopwoodA86). The HopwoodII decision held that
the University of Texas Law School could not use race as a factor in
admissions in order to achieve a diverse student body nor to eliminate any
present effects of past discrimination by actors other than the law school.8 7
The case was remanded back to district court for damages (Hopwood B"8 ).
The district court, in HopwoodB, ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled
to damages and also entered a permanent injunction proscribing consider-
ation of race in the law school's admissions process. 9 The court of appeals'
review of this decision in 2000 is known as Hopwood 111.90 Hopwood III
reversed the injunction against any consideration of race in the admissions
program and also analyzed the diversity and remedial interests discussed
in Hopwood I. 9" Both Hopwood II and Hopwood III held that diversity is
not a compelling governmental interest and that in order for remedial
purposes to be a compelling interest the past discrimination must be
specific to the law school.92
1. The Diversity Rationale
Hopwoodl9 first struck down the diversity rationale of Bakke that the
district court supported. The court stated that "any consideration of race or
ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student
body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment."94 The
Hopwood III decision in 2000 affirmed this proposition, re-stating the
holding in Hopwood II that "the government cannot constitutionally use
racial preferences for the purpose of fostering student body diversity."'95
HopwoodlI ignores Justice Powell's diversity rationale set forth in Bakke.
The Hopwood II court argues instead that, although Justice Powell
"announced the judgment, no other Justice joined in that part of the opinion
s6 Hopwood A, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
87 Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 932.
88 Hopwood B, 999 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
89 Id.
9 Hopwood v. State of Texas (Hopwood 11), 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000).
91 Id.
92 See also Leslie Yalof Garfield, Hopwood v. Texas: Strict in Theory or Fatal
in Fact, 34 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 497 (May-June 1997) (providing a detailed look at
the Hopwood decisions).
93 See Hopwood v. State of Texas (Hopwood II), 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.
2000).
94 Id. at 944.
9
'HopwoodIII, 236 F.3d at 275.
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discussing the diversity rationale."96 Thus, according to the Fifth Circuit,
the diversity rationale is not binding.
The Hopwood II court also asserts that the Supreme Court only
accepted the diversity rationale on one occasion after Bakke.97 In Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,98 the Supreme Court used an intermediate
scrutiny standard to review a federal program that promoted diversity in
broadcasting. However, a few years later, it-overruled this intermediate
scrutiny standard in Adarand v. Pena" and called for strict scrutiny in race-
based programs. Since Metro Broadcasting, diversity has not been used by
the Supreme Court as a compelling governmental interest in race-based
policies.
Hopwood II claims that, contrary to Justice Powell's argument in
Bakke, race alone does not promote diversity, which encompasses far more
than skin color.' In addition, the Hopwood II court asserts that racial
classifications can serve to stigmatize groups the programs are supposed to
help.' ' Thus, the court held that diversity is not a compelling interest. 2
2. The Remedial Governmental Interest
The district court in HopwoodA determined that "the remedial purpose
of the law school's affirmative action program is a compelling government
objective."' 3 The Fifth Circuit distinguished this argument from the
diversity one, noting that a majority of the Supreme Court has justified the
use of race for remedial purposes.' ° As determined in Wygant and Croson,
past discrimination must be specific to the governmental unit involved. 5
The Fifth Circuit found in Hopwood II "that the district court erred in
expanding the remedial justification to reach all public education within the
State of Texas,"'0 6 and that racial remedies need to be limited in order to
96 Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 944.97 id.
98 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547
(1990).
" Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
1oo Hopwood I, 78 F.3d at 946.
101 Id.
102 Id.
'o3HopwoodA, 861 F. Supp. 551, 573 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
104 Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 948.
101 Id. at 949-51. See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 505
(1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
'16 Hopwood I, 78 F.3d at 950.
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retain a "logical stopping point."' °7 In Hopwood, the discrimination relied
on to support the claimed remedial interest was not specific to the law
school. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the University of Texas law
school was not the appropriate actor to remedy discrimination in the
education system as a whole.' The Court held that the University of Texas
law school needed to be able to show present effects of past discrimination
that plagued the school.0 9 The present effects the law school proffered and
the Fifth Circuit struck down were the perception of being a "white"
school,"0 a present hostile environment,"' and underrepresentation of
minorities due to past discrimination." 2 These arguments, however, failed
because there was no evidence of overt discrimination at the University of
Texas. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit held that the race-based law school
admissions program could not be motivated by a desire to remedy the
effects of general discrimination in the Texas education system. " 3
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Hopwood II decision in its Hopwood III
ruling in 2000. "' The court reiterated that a government entity may use race
for a remedial purpose provided its focus is on discrimination specific to
that entity.' However, the University of Texas School of Law failed to
prove this requirement.
B. The Ninth Circuit: Smith v. University of Washington
While the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Justice Powell's diversity
argument in Bakke, other courts have upheld the diversity rationale. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Smith v. University of Washington," 6
followed Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke by declaring that diversity is a
permissible goal, sufficient to fulfill the first prong in the strict scrutiny
review. In Smith, Katuria Smith was denied admission to the University of
'o
7 Id. (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275).
'I81d. at 95 1.
0 Id.
"




3 Id. at 954.
"4 Hopwood v. State of Texas (Hopwood I1), 236 F.3d 256, 273-74 (5th Cir.
2000).
"
5 Id. at 273.




Washington School of Law in 1994.117 She and other rejected candidates
filed a lawsuit a few years later claiming that the law school "illegal[ly]
discriminat[ed] against Caucasians and others on the basis of their race." 1 8
The district court refused to grant "Smith a partial summary judgment on
[her] claim that.., race cannot be used as a factor in achieving educational
diversity, although it may be used for certain limited remedial purposes."' 19
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.
1. The Diversity Rationale
In Smith, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declared that there was
"no doubt that the district court's decision faithfully followed Justice
Powell's opinion in... Bakke.' 120 InBakke, the Court determined that "the
attainment of a diverse student body 'is a constitutionally permissible goal
for an institution of higher education.""'12' The Smith court reemphasized
this assertion.
The Ninth Circuit addressed the same issue that the Hopwood court
faced regarding whether Justice Powell's diversity rationale is binding
Supreme Court authority since "none of the other Justices fully agreed with
Justice Powell's opinion."1" The court stated that "[w]hen a fragmented
court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.' ,123 In Bakke, it was the opinion of the Stevens Group
thatjoined Powell in striking down the admissions policy. However, Justice
Stevens' opinion broadly proclaimed that Title VI precluded all race-
conscious admission policies. 24 This left Justice Powell's decision to be
the narrower of concurring opinions. However, the Brennan Group thought
that the admissions program was constitutional and, with Powell, consti-
tuted a majority of Justices who agreed that an admissions policy could
consider race. 125 Thus, the Smith court concluded that "a race-based
I" Id. at 1191.
'Is Id.
119Id.
120 Id. at 1196.
121 Id. at 1197 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
311-12 (1978)).
'DId. at 1198.
'2 Id. at 1199 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
14 Id. at 1198.
125 Id. at 1198-99.
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possibility must be taken to be the actual rationale adopted by the Court."'2s
In either case, Justice Powell's decision is the narrowest, and thus may be
considered the Court's holding.
1 27
The Ninth Circuit noted that Supreme Court cases since Bakke have not
looked favorably upon race-based policies. However, Smith asserted the
distinction that the Supreme Court "has not returned to the area of
university admissions, and has not indicated that Justice Powell's approach
has lost its vitality in that unique niche of our society."'' 28 The Ninth Circuit
declared that it is the Supreme Court's authority to overrule the Bakke case
if and when those race-based rationales become obsolete.' 29 Thus, the court
held that the opinion of Justice Powell and the diversity rationale in the
Bakke case are good law.
2. The Remedial Governmental Interest
In Smith, the law school does not claim that its policy has a remedial
effect. Thus, the remedial justification of race-based admissions policies is
not an issue. However, the court does briefly discuss the remedial interest
in its interpretation of Bakke. The Smith court asserted that "'the State
certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or
eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimina-
tion.' "30 While the remedial interest issue is not essential to the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Smith, the court, in dicta, upheld the validity of the
remedial interest by arguing that Justice Powell's decision is the correct
Bakke holding.
C. The Epitome of the Bakke Split: The Michigan Cases
Two very recent decisions in Michigan illustrate most vividly the
uncertainty associated with university race-based admission policies. These
cases, Gratz v. Bollinger'3 1 and Grutter v. Bollinger,'32 attempt to determine
the validity of racial classifications in admissions programs at the same
121Id. at 1199.
127 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
121 Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200.
129 Id.
'
30 Id. at 1197 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
307 (1978)).
131 Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
132 Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich 2001).
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university. However, the holdings of these two cases are very different: the
Eastern District Court of Michigan found one policy constitutional while
finding the other, similar program, unconstitutional.
1. Gratz v. Bollinger
In Gratz, the plaintiffs filed suit claiming that the University of
Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by considering race as a
factor in its admission policy.133 The court applied the strict scrutiny test
due to the inherently suspect racial distinctions in the policy. 34 The
university claimed that a diverse student body is a compelling government
interest, which the court addresses in the 2000 Gratz decision. 5 The
university did not claim that its policies served a remedial purpose;
however, Defendant-Intervenors, comprised of a group of minority students
who had applied for or intended to apply for admission to the university,
asserted the claim that the admissions policy served a remedial purpose.3 6
This rationale is addressed in the 2001 Gratz decision.'37
In the first Gratz decision, the court interpreted Bakke to determine
whether or not the diversity rationale is a compelling government interest.
The court initially noted that "the separate opinions in Bakke ... clearly
illustrate[ ] that there were no clear grounds upon which a majority of the
Court agreed in reaching their respective decisions."' 38 The court ultimately
adopted Justice Powell's diversity interest; however, it arrived at its
conclusion in a slightly different manner than did the Smith court.'3 9 The
Gratz court declares that while there are not five Justices concluding that
diversity is a compelling interest in Bakke, there are five Justices who
believe that race may be considered, if properly done, in admissions
policies. 4 The court proposes that Justice Brennan's silence as to the
diversity issue is not necessarily a rejection of the idea;' 4' in the later Metro
3 Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 813-14 (Plaintiffs also claimed that the policy




137 Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
138 Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 817-18.
139 Id. at 820.
140Id. at 819.
141 Id. at 820.
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Broadcasting14 2 case, Justice Brennan explicitly recognizes Justice
Powell's diversity argument from Bakke.'43 The Gratz court specifically
disagreed with Hopwood's'" outcome that a diverse student body is not a
compelling interest, instead holding that diversity is in fact a compelling
interest.
The court then examined whether the university admissions program
was narrowly tailored to accomplish the diversity interest. In Bakke, Justice
Powell made it clear that rigid quotas are not permissible. By simply setting
aside a predetermined number of minority seats, non-preferred minorities
and Caucasians "are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants
from the preferred groups for the special admissions seats," regardless of
the strength of their qualifications. 45 The Gratz court agreed, stating that
in order "to achieve the educational benefits associated with a racially and
ethnically diverse student body, more than a token number of under-
represented minority students is required."' 46 However, the court also noted
that "it is often a thin line that divides the permissible from the impermissi-
ble." 47 The present admissions program at the University of Michigan, in
effect since 1999, was found to be a permissible use of race that is narrowly
tailored. The program employs a combination of methods to promote
diversity: minority applicants are given twenty points in calculating their
selection score and applicants that possess certain desirable qualities are
"flagged."' 48 Thus, minority applicants are not isolated from the rest of the
candidate pool. 49 The Gratz court found that this admissions policy
satisfies the Bakke requirements and is therefore constitutional. 50
It was not until the 2001 Gratz ruling that the court addressed the
remedial interest issue posed by the Defendant-Intervenors. Applying strict
scrutiny, the court looked for a specific occurrence of discrimination
performed by the university. The court also examined the program to
determine whether it appropriately addressed the effects of the discrimina-
tion. However, the Defendant-Intervenors "failed to present any evidence
142 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
"'3 Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 820.
'4Hopwood v. State of Texas (HopwoodII1), 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000).
14' Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 (1978).
'4 Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 830.
47 Id. at 827.
148 Id.
149 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316 ("[T]he race of an applicant may tip the balance
in [his] favor just a geographic origin or a life spent on a farm may tip the balance
in other candidates' cases.") (Powell, J., concurring).
15o Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
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that the discrimination alleged by them, or the continuing effects of such
discrimination, was the real justification for the . . . race-conscious
admissions programs." 5' Additionally, the Defendant-Intervenors failed to
establish the existence of the identified discrimination or the necessity of
the admissions policies to remedy such discrimination." 2 Thus, the court
rejected the Defendant-Intervenors' argument since they "failed to cite any
evidence that the ... race-conscious admissions criteria were actually
motivated by a.desire to remedy any past or present discrimination by theUniversity." '
Gratz, like the Ninth Circuit, follows Justice Powell's decision in
Bakke. The Gratz court asserts that both the diversity interest and remedial
interest are sufficient to fulfill the first prong of strict scrutiny.
2. Grutter v. Bollinger
In Grutter v. Bollinger,' Grutter's 1996 application for admission to
the University of Michigan Law School was rejected. She claimed that the
law school discriminated against her on the basis of race, which is a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.'
The court examined the diversity issue by stating that Bakke is "the
only case in which the high court has ever addressed the 'diversity
rationale' as a justification for considering race in reviewing an application
for admission to a university."''5 6 As in Hopwood, the Grutter court
believed that, due to the fragmented Bakke court, the Bakke opinion "did
not hold that a state educational institution's desire to assemble a racially
diverse student body is a compelling government interest."'5 7 The Grutter
court further declared that even if diversity was a compelling state interest,
the law school's admissions policy was not sufficiently narrowly tailored
to, fulfill the second prong of the strict scrutiny test.
The court also examined the remedial interest of the questioned race-
based admissions policies. The law school attempted to argue that the
program was a remedy for past discrimination against minorities.5 , As
' Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790, 795 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
'
5 2 Id. at 796.
5 Id. at 802.
'Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
'"Id. at 824 (The plaintiff also claimed that the defendant law school violated
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
'6 Id. at 843.




elaborated in earlier cases, societal discrimination alone can never be a
justification for racial classifications.'59 In Grutter, the court found "there
has been no evidence, or even an allegation, that the law school or the
University ofMichigan has engaged in racial discrimination."' 6 Therefore,
the university's admissions policy was not justified by any remedial
interests.
Grutter is consistent with the Hopwood Court's interpretation of the
Bakke case. Unlike Gratz, the court in Grutter held that a diverse student
body is not a compelling governmental interest. 6' Thus, the race-based
admissions policy at the University of Michigan's School of Law violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
D. The Sixth Circuit: A Decision on Grutter v. Bollinger
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals delivered its highly emotional
decision on Grutter v. Bollinger in May, 2002.162 The district court had
determined that diversity should not be a compelling governmental interest
in university admissions policies. In a five to four en banc decision, the
court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling, finding the law school's
admissions program constitutional and announcing that achieving a diverse
student body is a compelling interest.
1. The Diversity Rationale
The Sixth Circuit, in its argument in support of diversity as a govern-
mental interest, focused on the Bakke case. Since a law school is "the
proving ground for legal learning and practice, [it] cannot be effective in
isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law inter-
acts.' 63 Justice Powell's decision in Bakke, according to the majority
opinion, is binding law under Marks v. United States.'" Like the Ninth
119 Id. at 869.
'60 Id.
161 See Daniel Leonardi, Race-Conscious Admissions in Higher Education, 28
J.C. & U.L. 153 (2001) (discussing in detail the Gratz and Grutter cases).
162 Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002).
163 Id. at 739 (quoting Justice Powell's Bakke decision (quoting Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950))).
'"Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in thejudgments on the narrowest grounds." (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 n. 15 (1976))). See also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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Circuit, the Sixth Circuit found that, under Marks, Justice Powell's decision
is the narrowest rationale, and is the rationale that should be followed.'65
The Sixth Circuit asserted that Justice Brennan's concurrence in Bakke
provided some support of Justice Powell's diversity argument."6 Justice
Brennan declared the "Harvard plan" to be constitutional under his
concurrence "at least so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated
student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past discrimina-
tion."'167 This statement, according to the Sixth Circuit, implicitly supported
Justice Powell's belief that diversity is a compelling interest. 68 The
Hopwood court used the same statement to support its contention that
Brennan implicitly rejected diversity as a compelling interest. 69 However,
the Sixth Circuit examined the language, claiming "at least so long as" does
not mean "only if."' 7° Furthermore, the court claimed that the Brennan
quote provided that a constitutional goal is "achieving an integrated student
body," which is distinguished from the assertion that it is permissible to use
race to achieve an integrated student body "so long as necessitated by the
lingering effects of past discrimination."'' Additionally, to support Justice
Brennan's approval of diversity as a compelling interest, the court cited to
the post-Bakke case, Metro Broadcasting. In that opinion, Justice Brennan
quoted Justice Powell's Bakke decision claiming that "'a diverse student
body' contributing to a 'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally
permissible goal' on which race-conscious university admissions programs
may be predicated."'7
The Sixth Circuit rejected the notion that cases such as Adarand and
City of Richmond v. Croson, Co. preclude the possibility of diversity as a
65 According to Brennan's concurrence in Bakke, an "intermediate scrutiny
standard would apply to 'benign' racial classifications." Justice Powell, on the
other hand, applied strict scrutiny to all racial classifications. Therefore, the Sixth
Circuit reasoned that "[b]ecause the set of constitutionally permissible racial
classifications under intermediate scrutiny by definition includes those classifica-
tions constitutionally permissible under strict scrutiny, Justice Powell's rationale
would permit the most limited consideration of race." Grutter, 288 F.3d at 741.
I" Id. at 742-43.
167 Id. at 742 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 326
n.1 (1978)).
6 Id. at 742-43.
'6 See Hopwood v. State of Texas (Hopwood fl), 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
170 Grutter, 288 F.3d at 742.
171 Id. at 743.
'
72 Id. (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (quoting Bakke,
438 U.S. at 311-13)).
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compelling governmental interest. 7 1 Those cases dealt with employment
situations and held that racial classifications were unconstitutional unless
they serve a remedial purpose. 74 The Sixth Circuit noted that because the
Supreme Court previously stated that "if a precedent of [the] Court has
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions.'7 Therefore, the Bakke case should be
followed.
The Court of Appeals found the law school's admissions program to be
narrowly tailored. The policy at issue was carefully drafted, with no
utilization of a quota system. A 'plus' factor was employed instead,
allowing the school to consider more than just race. This admissions policy
was similar to the Supreme Court approved "Harvard plan" inBakke.76 The
rejected applicants to the law school claimed that the policy's pursuit of a
"critical mass" is the same as a quota system.'77 However, the "critical
mass" was not a set quota but rather an approximate-range that varied over
the years. '78 Since the Michigan law school's admissions program promoted
the compelling governmental interest of a diverse student body and was
narrowly tailored to serve that interest, it fulfilled the requirements of strict
scrutiny and was therefore deemed constitutional.
2. The Remedial Governmental Interest
Although the district court asserted that the admissions policy at the
law school was not justified by remedial concerns, the Sixth Circuit does
not address the remedial interest in its Grutter decision. However, by
accepting Bakke as binding law, the general idea of a remedial use of racial
classifications is supported.
'73 See Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989); Grutter, 288 F.3d at 732.
114 Grutter, 288 F.3d at 743. See also Leonardi, supra note 161, at 178-95.
'" Grutter, 288 F.3d at 743-44 (alteration in original) (quoting Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)).
176 Id. at 746.
'"Id. at 747-48.
'
78 Id. at 748. While the dissent argues that the "critical mass" is equivalent to
forty-four to forty-seven minority members per class (about 13.5%), the majority




I. REACTIONS TO THE ELIMINATION
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN UNIVERSITIES
Due to the Supreme Court's hesitation to provide a definite answer as
to the constitutionality of certain race-based programs, many states whose
courts have struck down race-based admissions policies have been forced
to search for alternate means of attaining the benefits of affirmative action.
Such examples are Texas and California, which have taken new initiatives
in adopting socioeconomic admissions policies. However, these policies
could be prone to problems similar to those faced by race-based programs.
This section will address those new schemes.
A. Various State Reactions
1. California's Proposition 209
In 1996, California let voters decide how to handle the race debate.
They introduced a proposal which would eliminate state and local
government affirmative action programs in the areas of public education,
public employment, and public contracting.'79 Basically, the effect of this
program on state universities was that they would no longer be able to use
race or ethnicity as factors in their admissions decisions.
This proposition, known as the California Civil Rights Initiative
("CCRI"), became law after it passed by a vote of fifty-four percent to
forty-six percent in November of 1996."' It was ultimately codified in
Article I of California's Constitution: "[t]he state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of
public employment, public education, or public contracting."'' Opponents
attempted to dispose of Proposition 209 by filing suit, claiming that the new
provision prohibiting public race and gender preferences denied equal
protection and conflicted with federal civil rights statutes. 2 However, the
'9 Prohibition Against Discrimination or Preferential Treatment by State and
Other Public Entities, Analysis by Legislative Analyst, at http://www.ss.ca.gov/
Vote96/htmlIBP/209.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2002).
10 D. Frank Vinik et al., Affirmative Action in College Admissions: Practical
Advice to Public and Private Institutions for Dealing with the Changing
Landscape, 26 J.C. & U.L. 395, 412 (Winter 2000).
181 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3 1(a).
182 Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 1997).
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Ninth Circuit held that this new initiative did not violate the United States
Constitution or "conflict[ ] with any decision of the Supreme Court." '
Since then, California state universities have not been permitted to consider
race in admissions decisions. Other states have followed California's lead
by enacting statutes similar to Proposition 209. For instance, voters in
Washington state passed Initiative 200 ("I-200")'4 in 1998, which was then
codified with language identical to that of Proposition 209.85
Since Proposition 209, California schools have turned to other means
of attaining diversity and providing "affirmative action" programs.8 6 Some
schools, for instance, are experimenting with types of class-based
affirmative action policies.187 In these admissions programs, instead of
using race as a factor, a potential student's socioeconomic background is
considered. 8 The University of California at Los Angeles has used
residential location as a means to enroll minority students.8 9 With this
policy, the backgrounds of students from high schools in underprivileged
minority areas are given some weight in admissions procedures. The
University of California implemented a "Top Four Percent" policy effective
in 2001.190 This program allows the top four percent of students from all
California high schools to be admitted into a UC campus."'
2. Texas
Texas considered an idea similar to Proposition 209 shortly thereafter,
known as "Houston Proposition A."'92 Unlike the California initiative,
I83 Vinik et al., supra note 180, at 412 (quoting Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122
F.3d at 719).
114Id. at 407.
"' WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (1) (West 2001).
116 See Martin D. Carcieri, Operational Need, Political Reality, and Liberal
Democracy: Two Suggested Amendments to Proposition 209-Based Reforms, 9
SETON HAL CONST. L.J. 459, 466 (Spring 1999) (arguing that Proposition 209
needs to provide a temporary exception for university admissions).
187 See Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral
Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2332 (2000).
188/d.
"
9 Id. at 2333.
'90 Jennifer Hudson, Four Percent Plan Will Not Increase Diversity, Report
Says, UCLA DAILY BRUIN, Apr. 14, 2000, available at http://www.cir-usa.org/
articles.
191 Id.
"9 Vinik et al., supra note 180, at 412-13.
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Texas voters did not pass this proposition.' 93 However, the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Hopwood precluded the use of race to achieve student diversity.
Therefore, public universities have been searching for new admissions
programs for minorities.
After looking at various possibilities for their universities, Texas
selected a program dubbed "Affirmative Access,"' 94 also known as the
"Top Ten Percent" policy, which was enacted into law in 1997.' 9 This
program "automatically admits students who graduate in the top ten percent
of the high school class into the University of Texas system."' 96 It is
codified in Texas' Education Code stating:
Each general academic teaching institution shall admit an applicant for
admission to the institution as an undergraduate student if the applicant
graduated with a grade point average in the top 10 percent of the student's
high school graduating class in one of the two school years preceding the
academic year for which the applicant is applying for admission and the
applicant graduated from a public or private high school in this state...197
Other states have implemented similar top percentage programs' 98 The
state of Florida has implemented one such program, automatically
admitting the top twenty percent of the graduates from each Florida public
high school to one of the state's public colleges.' 9
B. The Effects ofthe NewAdmissions Policies on Universities 'Enrollment
The new socioeconomic and top percentage plans have arisen to take
the place of race-based affirmative action policies. However, these pro-
'
93 Id. at 412.
'94 See The Center for Individual Rights, Alternatives to Affirnative Action, at
http://www.cir-usa.org/articles/michiganLalternativeAA.html (last visited Sept. 14,
2002).
"I David Montejano, Access to the University of Texas at Austin and the Ten
Percent Plan: A Three YearAssessment, Admissions Research atUT Austin, (Mar.
2,2001), atwww.utexas.edu/student/research/reports/admissions/Montejanopaper.
htm.
'96 The Center for Individual Rights, supra note 194, at http://www.cir-usa.
org/articles/michiganaltemativeAA.html.
'
97 TEx. EDUC. § 51.803 (Vernon 2001).
See, e.g., Eligibility in the Local Context, Univ. of Cal. Riverside, at http://
www.admissions.ucr.edu/preparing/default.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2002).
'99 Vinik et al., supra note 180, at 416.
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grams may not be as effective as the race-based admissions policies in
increasing minority groups' enrollment in universities.
Many argue that the top percentage plans do not aid in increasing
minority enrollment. Rather, these programs increase the diversity of
statewide economic representation by automatically admitting students in
the top of the class of all high schools throughout the state.2 They do help
some minorities that are in the top of their classes, particularly those in
predominately minority schools.2"' However, many schools are not
predominately minority schools, so the top percentage plan serves to
automatically admit a large number of Caucasians.
Socioeconomic programs will help to provide "affirmative action" to
all those who are underprivileged, regardless of race. By focusing solely on
prospective students' economic and social standing, affirmative action
would be extended to reach all disadvantaged students, not just those racial
groups termed "disadvantaged minorities." Supporters of socioeconomic
affirmative action claim this type of program presents several advantages:
1) it would be legally defensible, 2) it would enjoy broader public support
because it includes more people, and 3) it would eliminate difficult
questions under a race-basedprogram such as why an African-American
student from an affluent background should obtain preference in
admissions over a Caucasian student from a poor background.20 2
Also, racial diversity on college campuses may increase since socioeco-
203nomic programs benefit large numbers of racial minorities.
200 Montejano, supra note 195. Since every single school, urban and rural,
across the state is included, nonminority students who come from poor communi-
ties are helped by the percentage policy.
201 See id. The author discusses the "new sender" high schools in Texas in
reference to UT-Austin. These new feeder schools consist of "distinct clusters of
inner-city minority high schools in Dallas-Ft. Worth, Houston and San Antonio,
and rural white high schools in East and Northeast Texas." Id.
202 Vinik et al., supra note 180, at 423. See also Derrick Bell, Guarding
Diversity Programs from Political and Judicial Attack, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Apr. 4, 1997, at B4.
203 Vinik et al., supra note 180, at 423. But see Thomas Glenn Martin, Jr.,
UCLA School ofLaw Admissions in the Aftermath of the U. C. Regents'Resolution
to Eliminate Affirmative Action: An Admissions Policy Survey and Proposal, 18
CHICANO-LATrNO L. REv. 150, 174 (1996) ("Because socioeconomic disadvantage
has a somewhat ambiguous relationship to race, the preference of the socioecono-




C. The Constitutional Implications of the New Admissions Programs
The new race-neutral university admissions programs may be
unconstitutional, implicating the same problems that plague race-based
policies.2 A racially discriminatory purpose triggers the Equal Protection
Clause, even if no racial classifications are used. 0 If a university
admissions program's purpose is to benefit minorities, even absent racial
classifications, then it is discriminatory and the strict scrutiny standard
applies. 6
In Washington v. Davis,2"7 black applicants who were not hired as
police officers for the District of Columbia claimed that a written test
required for all applicants was racially discriminatory. The plaintiffs
claimed that the test, excluded a disproportionate number of African-
Americans.2 8 The Supreme Court stated that "an invidious discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts,
including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race
than another."' " However, the Court went on to say:
[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends
otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the
Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion
of one race than of another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but
it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination
forbidden by the Constitution.210
In other words, a law will not trigger the strict scrutiny standard simply
because it has a disproportionate racial impact. Rather, in order to violate
the'Equal Protection Clause, the disproportionate impact must be traced to
a purpose to discriminate.
In PersonnelAdministrator ofMassachusetts v. Feeney,1 the plaintiffs
were females who claimed that a state statute, which favored veterans who
qualified for state civil service positions over other applicants, discrimi-
2+ Forde-Mazmi, supra note 187, at 2333.
205 Id.
X6id.
207 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1976).
208 Id. at 233.
209 Id. at 242.
210 Pd 
r211 Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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nated against women. This statute had the effect of limiting employment
opportunities for women. Although Feeney addresses gender discrimina-
tion, the Court notes that racial classifications are presumptively invalid
and are subject to strict scrutiny." 2 This "applies as well to a classification
that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimina-
tion."2 3
The Supreme Court applied a two fold inquiry to this facially gender-
neutral statute that had adverse effects on women.214 The first inquiry is
whether the statutory classification is actually neutral.215 If the classifica-
tion itself is neutral, then "the second question is whether the adverse effect
reflects invidious gender-based discrimination."216 The impact of a
particular statute "provides an 'important starting point' but purposeful
discrimination is 'the condition that offends the Constitution. ""217 The court
must then determine the legislative purpose of the statute. In order for the
purpose to be discriminatory, and thus in violation of the Constitution, the
legislature must have "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action
at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group."21 In applying this inquiry to Feeney, the
Supreme Court held that the veterans' statute was constitutional. The
legislative history showed that the statute was created to ensure a prefer-
ence for veterans of either sex over non-veterans, not to create a preference
for men over women."
9
Applying these Supreme Court holdings to affirmative action pro-
grams may cause the new admissions programs to be invalidated as having
a racially discriminatory purpose.22 ° When "a legislature or public
university intentionally seeks to admit minority students through race-
neutral means, such as disadvantage-based preferences, it has taken a
course of action 'because of' and not merely 'in spite of' its effect on racial
212 zd. at 272.
213 Id. See also Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
214 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274.
2 15Id.
216 id.
217 Id. (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977) and Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971)).
2
. Id. at 279.
219 id.
220 But see Carcieri, supra note 186 (suggesting that class-based preferences do
not involve a suspect classification).
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minorities."'" Thus, these policies will be subject to the same strict
scrutiny analysis as the original race-based affirmative action programs.
If these race-neutral programs are found to have the purpose of
benefiting minorities then programs such as Texas' "Top Ten Percent" and
California's socioeconomic affirmative action would be subject to the same
strict scrutiny test as the race-based classifications. These new programs
would then have to meet the two prongs of strict scrutiny: (1) serving a
compelling governmental interest, and (2) being narrowly tailored to fulfill
that interest.222 Given the outcome of many cases, such as Hopwood, this
standard may be difficult to meet. The new policies would have to serve a
remedial interest or be found to ensure diversity. Even then, some
jurisdictions, like the Fifth Circuit, do not consider diversity to be a
compelling interest. In order to meet the remedial interest, the race-neutral
program would have to alleviate discrimination specific to the school at
hand, which is often hard to prove. Thus, these race-neutral programs may
suffer just as the race-based programs have.
IV. THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The future of affirmative action is uncertain. The Supreme Court has
refused, thus far, to reconsider a case such as Bakke, leaving the Circuit
Courts of Appeals on their own to interpret the issue. Unless the Supreme
Court makes a final decision on this matter, the appellate courts will
continue to create inconsistency in their treatment of affirmative action
programs, perhaps injuring minorities, as well as universities, in their
jurisdictions. The two key interests in maintaining affirmative action
programs in university settings are the diversity and remedial interests.
A. The Diversity Interest
Diversity in universities is an important, if not necessary, part of a well-
rounded educational system. The United States is progressively becoming
=' Forte-Mazrui, supra note 187, at 2348.
22 Socioeconomic programs may also be suspect if race is involved when
defining the class. See Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action:
Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1847, 1860 (1996) ("[A]ny attempt by a
legislature or other public body to adopt a class metric that recognizes interactions
among race, ethnicity, gender, and class might well be struck down by the Court
as a subterfuge, a reintroduction of race- and gender-based affirmative action
through the back door.").
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more multicultural; therefore it is essential that Americans learn about and
experience various cultures.223 A diverse student body will allow students
to experience different cultures through firsthand interactions with other
students. Institutions of higher education "must be accorded the right to
select those students who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange
of ideas." 224 In addition, various races and ethnicities in a class may
prompt professors to approach their class subject matter in a different
manner, encompassing a broad array of perspectives from different
cultures. University students should be granted the opportunity to gain
"'wide exposure' to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this
Nation of many people." '225
Diversity in higher education is not only important because of its
benefits to the educational environment, but is also imperative in preparing
students to interact and succeed in the world post-graduation.226 Physicians,
lawyers, business people, and other professionals, serve a "heterogeneous
population" and thus the "interplay of ideas and the exchange of views" is
vital to graduates' ability to provide "service to humanity."227 The United
States is becoming increasingly diverse.22 In 2000, African Americans,
Native Americans, Asian Americans, and Hispanics made up twenty-nine
percent of the population of the United States.229 According to one estimate,
these groups will constitute forty-seven percent, almost half, of the United
States' population by the year 2050.230 Therefore, it is imperative that
university students experience a broad variety of perspectives and ideas in
order to be able to succeed in this increasingly diverse nation.23" '
223 Wilbert Jenkins, Why We Must Retain Affirmative Action, USA TODAY
Magazine (Sept. 1999), available athttp://www.fmdarficles.com/cf.natrvw/m1272/
2652_128/56459125/p7/article.jhtml?term=%2BAffirniative+%2Baction+%2
Bregulations+%2Betc.
224 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978).
225 Id.
226 See Brief of Amici Curiae 3M, Abbott Laboratories et al., Gratz v. Bollinger
(6th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 01-1333, 01-1416, 01-1418).
227 Id.
228 See id.
229 See U.S. Census Bureau, Race and Hispanic or Latino: 2000, at http:/
factfinder.census.gov/bf/jang=en.vtname=DEC2000_SFl_U_QTP3_geo.id
=01000US.html.
230 Jon Meacham, The New Face of Race, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18, 2000, at 40.
23' Brief of Amici Curiae 3M et al., at 9-11. The amici offer a number of ways
a diverse educational setting promotes future success:
First, a diverse group of individuals educated in a cross-cultural environ-
ment has the ability to facilitate unique and creative approaches to problem-
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It is clear that diversity should be considered a compelling governmen-
tal interest. Some circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit,
already hold that diversity is a compelling interest substantial enough to
justify racial classifications in admissions programs.232 Of course, the
admissions policy must be tailored to adequately serve the goal of a diverse
student body. However, some courts have decided that diversity should not
be considered a compelling interest; thus, universities in those jurisdictions
have been deprived of their ability to pursue excellence by adequately
determining which students have the most to contribute to the environment
and which students possess the most promise of success.233
If courts strike down diversity as a compelling interest in race-based
admissions policies, they may also doom the alternative race-neutral
programs if they are found to have the purpose of benefiting certain
races. 234 This result would leave universities powerless to ensure that their
students receive the training necessary to succeed after graduation. Students
would be subject "'to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the
interplay of ideas and the exchange of views"' that will help mold them
into well-rounded, adept professionals.235
The only way to ensure the best education for the future leaders of
America is to provide universities the power to create a diverse atmosphere.
By holding that diversity is a compelling government interest, the Supreme
Court would effectively guarantee that students at public universities will
be able to experience the benefits associated with the "robust exchange of
ideas. 236
solving arising from the integration of different perspectives. Second, such
individuals are better able to develop products and services that appeal to
a variety of consumers and to market offerings in ways that appeal to these
consumers. Third, a racially diverse group of managers with cross-cultural
experience is better able to work with business partners, employees, and
clientele in the United States and around the world. Fourth, individuals that
have been educated in a diverse setting are likely to contribute to a positive
work environment by decreasing incidents of discrimination and stereotyp-
ing. Finally, an educational environment created by consideration of the
potential promise of each applicant in light of his or her experiences and
background is likely to produce the most talented workforce.
Id.
232 See supra Part II.
233 See Amici Curiae 3M et al., at 11.
2 See supra Part Im.
23' Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (quoting
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)).36 Id. at 313.
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B. The Remedial Governmental Interest
Bakke and other Supreme Court decisions make it clear that there is a
"legitimate and substantial [governmental] interest in ameliorating or
eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimina-
tion."237 A remedial interest, therefore, will justify the use of racial
classifications in university admissions policies. However, this interest
often fails universities because they are unable to prove the existence of
present effects of past discrimination specific to their school. 38
In order to justify the use of racial classifications by claiming they
serve to remedy past discrimination, a university must be clear that the
discriminatory harms stem from the particular school's past,239 A university
cannot attempt to alleviate the effects of discrimination in society in
general or even in the educational system as a whole. 4° Rather, they must
show that the actual school is responsible for the present effects of past
discrimination. This can be a daunting task. In addition, those universities
without a discriminatory past cannot use this justification for race-based
admissions policies. Since this remedial interest is so difficult to prove,
most universities are not able to use this justification for race-based
admissions policies. Thus, universities must look for other interests, such
as diversity, to validate their policies.
CONCLUSION
The use of race-based admissions policies in a university setting
provides a plethora of benefits to the university and to the students it
educates. In order to retain these advantages, the Supreme Court must re-
address this issue and make clear that Justice Powell's decision in Bakke
is the law of the land. The Supreme Court, in its post-Bakke decisions, has
already unambiguously acknowledged that racial classifications can be used
to remedy past discrimination.241 However, this interest is not applicable to
all universities; those universities without discriminatory pasts will be
deprived of the opportunity to adequately choose the students who have the
237 Id. at 307.
238 See supra Part 11 and the discussion of the Hopwood case in Part H.A.
239 See Hopwood v. Univ. of Tex., 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex.), rev'd, 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1994). See also supra Part II.
24 Hopwood v. State of Texas (Hopwood I1), 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
241 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). See also supra Part I.B.
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most to contribute to the educational environment and those who have the
most potential. A diverse student body is then the best option to justify the
use of race in university admissions policies. In order to provide the leaders
of tomorrow with the skills! they need to succeed in a multicultural nation,
diversity should be' considered a compelling governmental interest for
justifying racial classifications in university settings.

